

—REVIEW ESSAY—

“We as Peoples Have the Right to Exist”: Threatened Nations and Climate Justice

Milla Emilia Vaha

CLIMATE JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS. *By Tracey Skillington.*
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. vii, 287 pp. US\$129.00, cloth. ISBN
978-1-137-02280-6.

DISAPPEARING ISLAND STATES. *By Jenny Grote Stoutenburg.*
Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2015. xvi, 486 pp. (Illustrations.) US\$240.00, cloth.
ISBN 978-90-04-30300-3.

**THREATENED ISLAND NATIONS: Legal Implications of Rising
Seas and a Changing Climate.** *By Michael B. Gerrard, Gregory E.*
Wannier. *Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. xix,*
639 pp. (Table, illustrations.) US\$160.00, paper. ISBN 978-1-107-02576-9.

ABSTRACT

Climate change currently affects several states and their citizens around the globe. As sea level rise is threatening to make some states completely uninhabitable, small island states serve as examples of states at the greatest risk. This review essay analyzes three recent contributions to the literature on climate change and the future of endangered populations. These books offer timely contributions regarding the prospects of threatened nations, as well as addressing the shape and content of global governance in the era of Anthropocene. The authors suggest some interesting and novel innovations, particularly for updating the international legislation surrounding climate governance. At the same time, given how unpredictable a process climate change is, the solutions we come up with should perhaps be bolder.

KEYWORDS: climate change, climate justice, international law, small island states.

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.5509/2017904767>

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“Adaptation for Kiribati is beyond our borders. Relocation is by far the only adaptation option, this is where migration with dignity comes in,” stated Anote Tong, the former president of Kiribati and one of the most vocal Pacific advocates, during his talk at the Pacific Island Development Forum in Suva on September 3, 2015.¹ The Pacific nations had gathered in Fiji to finalize their strategies for the forthcoming Paris climate negotiations.² The mood before the Paris summit was optimistic and the negotiations were expected to showcase “New Pacific Diplomacy.”³ The islanders left for Paris with great expectations and the outcome was considered a success.⁴ Small island states succeeded in having two of their most important climate goals drafted into the final document: article 8 on “loss and damage”⁵ and a recommendation to limit temperature rise to below 1.5 degrees Celsius.⁶ What would happen next was dependent on more powerful countries abiding by their climate responsibilities, for the first time being explicitly regulated and monitored by an international covenant.⁷

she explores the future of small island states threatened by climate change and she has conducted comparative research in the South Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. Her publications include edited chapters and articles in journals such as the *Journal of International Political Theory*, *International Politics*, and *Journal of Military Ethics*.

¹ Milla Emilia Vaha, field notes, Pacific Island Leaders Forum, Suva, 3 September 2015.

² The Concert of Parties (COP 21) meeting took place in Paris, France, on 30 November–12 December 2015.

³ Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte, eds., *The New Pacific Diplomacy* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2015).

⁴ Milla Emilia Vaha, field notes, Pacific Island Leaders Forum, Suva, 16 February 2016.

⁵ Loss and damage is intended to be an independent, complimentary element to adaptation and mitigation, the “third pillar” of climate change management. Article 8 of the Paris Agreement states that “Parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and damage.” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (hereafter UNFCCC), *Paris Agreement as contained in the report of the Conference of the Parties in its twenty-first session of 12 December 2015*, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1. Millar et al. trace back the history and development of loss and damage mechanism to the early 1990s. As they write in the introduction of their chapter, “extending the scope of a loss and damage mechanism to cover all or part of the costs of relocating climate-change-displaced communities has the potential to provide a coherent and integrated framework that will support longer-term risk reduction strategies, as well as providing access to both public and private sources of funding.” Ilona Millar, Catherine Gascoigne, and Elizabeth Caldwell, “Making Good the Loss: An Assessment of the Loss and Damage Mechanism under the UNFCCC Process,” in Gerrard and Wannier, *Threatened Island Nations*, 435. The formulation of loss and damage in the Paris Agreement is still rather vague and only time and future international negotiations will reveal what the practical implications of this mechanism will be.

⁶ According to article 2, the agreement aims at “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above preindustrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.” UNFCCC, *Paris Agreement*, 2. As we can see, the temperature goal of 1.5°C is a suggestion, not a binding goal, and the previous goal of 2°C is endorsed instead.

⁷ The Paris Agreement indeed offers new mechanisms for evaluating the progress of state parties including a new “global stocktake” (article 14) that assesses “the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of this Agreement and its long-term goals.” UNFCCC, *Paris Agreement*, 14.

The situation of small island states and other endangered populations under climate change is receiving an increasing amount of scholarly and public attention, quite deservedly so.⁸ We have entered into the era of the Anthropocene, a time in which threats to our planet are essentially of our own making.⁹ The Anthropocene is a phase that Skillington describes as one of “radical inequality,” one which requires new ways of thinking about global responsibilities.¹⁰ Climate change will have severe and irreversible consequences worldwide, with the most vulnerable societies and people being at the greatest risk. All the books discussed here are therefore timely contributions to this growing body of literature, and provide a thorough analysis of the various implications of the current climate crisis, with a particular focus on the fields of international politics and law.

In Gerrard and Wannier’s edited volume, a collection of articles from various climate change and law experts cover topics from climate immigration¹¹ to relocation,¹² law of the sea,¹³ accountability,¹⁴ and compensation.¹⁵ The contributors evaluate the possibilities and limitations of the contemporary international order’s ability to respond to the threats that endangered island nations face. Stoutenburg, for her part, digs deeper into contemporary international law. She offers an in-depth discussion of the legal framework, and then proposes solutions that would enable the threatened island nations to continue their existence after the possible inundation of their territory. Finally, Skillington explores a wider theoretical framework for climate justice. She discusses not only endangered populations

⁸ See, for instance, Jane McAdam, *Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Rosemary Rayfuse, “International Law and Disappearing States: Utilizing Maritime Entitlements to Overcome the Statehood Dilemma,” *University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series* (2010); Derek Wong, “Sovereignty Sunk? The Position of ‘Sinking States’ at International Law,” *Melbourne Journal of International Law* 14 (2013): 1–46; Lilian Yamamoto and Miguel Esteban, *Atoll Island States and International Law: Climate Change Displacement and Sovereignty* (Heidelberg: Springer, 2014).

⁹ Skillington, *Climate Justice*, 1–2.

¹⁰ Skillington, *Climate Justice*, 91.

¹¹ Katrina M. Wyman, “The National Immigration Policy Option,” in Gerrard and Wannier, *Threatened Island Nations*, 337–367; Skillington, *Climate Justice*, 177–206.

¹² Michele Klein Solomon and Koko Warner, “Protection of Persons Displaced as a Result of Climate Change: Existing Tools and Emerging Frameworks,” in Gerrard and Wannier, *Threatened Island Nations*, 243–298; Leslie A. Stein, “Domestic Law for Resettlement of Persons Displaced by Climate Change,” *Threatened Island Nations*, 369–405.

¹³ Ann Powers and Christopher Stucko, “Introducing the Law of the Sea and the Legal Implications of Rising Sea Levels,” in Gerrard and Wannier, *Threatened Island Nations*, 123–140; Clive Schofield and David Freestone, “Options to Protect Coastlines and Secure Maritime Jurisdictional Claims in the Face of Global Sea Level Rise,” in *Threatened Island Nations*, 141–165; Rosemary Reyfuse, “Sea Level Rise and Maritime Zones,” in *Threatened Island Nations*, 167–191; and Stoutenburg, *Disappearing Island States*, 73–236.

¹⁴ Jacob David Werksam, “Could a Small Island Successfully Sue a Big Emitter? Pursuing a Legal Theory and a Venue for Climate Justice,” in Gerrard and Wannier, *Threatened Island Nations*, 409–431.

¹⁵ Millar et al., “Making Good the Loss.”

but also offers a model of transnational climate justice from the perspective of human rights regimes.¹⁶

All the authors have important things to say about global climate governance. Climate change, as they note, impacts not only the individual lives of those at the highest risk but also affects the future of entire political communities and generations, the shape of the international legal order, as well as global policies towards migration, human rights, security, and trade. Climate change creates unique threats that require new ways of thinking, especially in terms of the management of harmful consequences. As it is impossible to address all the arguments and proposals presented in over a thousand pages of research, this article will concentrate on a few themes that are common throughout the literature under review. I will also suggest some future themes for studying the status of the endangered populations.

Law, Politics, and the Ethics of Future Climate Governance

The first overlapping theme is of course climate justice.¹⁷ Successful climate governance faces not only legal but political and moral obstacles as well, many of which are still unsolved. In the words of Skillington: “Proposals to establish new international standards of democratic justice, as well as a deliberative forum capable of addressing ... notably uneven quality in the distribution of the effects of global climate change, are routinely rejected on the grounds that such an authority would distort a perfectly legitimate, democratically founded *state-centred* normative order.”¹⁸ What is needed, first and foremost, is a united political will to tackle the pressing climate matters and a global consensus on rules and regulations for achieving shared goals. All of the authors offer important ideas on how climate justice could be better achieved through international cooperation. There is a pressing need, the authors agree across the board, for truly global solutions to the global problems created by climate change. In a sense, all the books share a cosmopolitan vision according to which those who can, ought to help those who are in need—regardless of where those in need are located—and that those who have contributed to climate harms the most should also bear the greatest responsibility.

¹⁶ See also Siobhán McInerney-Lankford, “Human Rights and Climate Change: Reflections on International Legal Issues and Potential Policy Relevance,” in Gerrard and Wannier, *Threatened Island Nations*, 195–241.

¹⁷ On recent contributions to climate justice debate, see Elizabeth Cripps, *Climate Change and the Moral Agent: Individual Duties in an Interdependent World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Clare Heyward and Dominic Roser, eds., *Climate Justice in a Non-Ideal World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Stephen Humphreys, ed., *Human Rights and Climate Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Henry Shue, *Climate Justice: Vulnerability and Protection* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

¹⁸ Skillington, *Climate Justice*, 92 (emphasis mine).

The second common theme derives directly from the first one. All the books depart from an assumption that states are the key actors in achieving climate justice. What is discussed here is the international management of the unwanted implications of climate change. Even Skillington, who begins her work by stating that what is needed is “an order of justice where national, regional, and global interests are treated together,”¹⁹ and further calls for “justice for all subjected,”²⁰ spends most of the book discussing states as the duty-bearers of global climate justice. Climate justice debates continue to struggle with the “problem of global justice”²¹ and the unavoidability of thinking climate justice in statist terms.

The third unifying theme is the future. Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time and climate-effected hazards have direct and irreversible consequences on people, property, business, financial systems, and state institutions worldwide.²² All the volumes under review are future-oriented and aim at offering a framework through which climate change implications could be approached and problems eventually solved. By building on the present, the authors envision how the future could look and how the dangers could be sufficiently mitigated, if not reversed.

The authors of all three books bring important and topical issues to the research agenda of climate justice, politics, and international law, yet they are unable to “think outside the box,” the most serious limitation being their focus on the current international legal framework. The consequences of climate change are uncertain. While acknowledging this, the authors seek guidance from the existing law and existing political status quo, despite the fact that we are not quite sure about the extent and severity of the events we are anticipating.

Take the continuity of endangered states, discussed in all three books, as an example. Stoutenburg makes an attractive proposal on how the continuity of threatened small island states could be guaranteed by a moral (if not legal) duty of continuous recognition.²³ According to Stoutenburg, because small island states have not themselves significantly contributed to their potential extinction, they should not be punished for the negative consequences of climate change.²⁴ Maxine Burkett (in Gerrard and Wannier) makes a similar proposal when she states that by accommodating a new category of “Nation

¹⁹ Skillington, *Climate Justice*, 66.

²⁰ Skillington, *Climate Justice*, 67–72.

²¹ Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice,” *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 33, no. 2 (2005): 113–147.

²² United Nations, *The Future We Want*, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 66/288 of 27 July 2012.

²³ Stoutenburg, *Disappearing Island States*, chapter 6.

²⁴ Stoutenburg, *Disappearing Island States*, 373–374. For alternative accounts of “deterritorialised” states, see John Connell and Jack Corbett, “Deterritorialisation: Reconceptualizing Development in the Pacific Islands,” *Global Society* 30, no. 4 (2016): 583–604; Jørgen Ødalen, “Underwater Self-

ex-Situ,” a state on foreign territory, international legal order could take into account the needs of endangered nations in new territories.²⁵ Both authors imply that small island states share a common “moral innocence” that has to be acknowledged in their future treatment as states and political communities. Moral innocence is a feature commonly attached to small island states, and actively employed as a strategy by these states themselves in international forums. The leaders of small island states repeatedly refer to themselves as the moral voice, thereby confirming the position of these states as the victims of negative climate impacts of which the international community is responsible.²⁶

Interestingly, by relying on the existing legal framework, the authors limit themselves from truly taking on the normative aspects of state-extinction²⁷ and its consequences for the international state system in the future. Proposals to relocate political communities to new territories within other sovereign states corresponds poorly to the structure of the contemporary state system as it is currently regulated by contemporary international law. In the *Suva Declaration* of September 2015, the Pacific leaders urged the Conference of Parties in Paris to ensure “that human rights to exist *as a people* are protected.”²⁸ Small island states are therefore calling for the right to continuous existence as states (or, at least as “nations”). How could the international order protect “the human right to exist as a people” if and when this would require redrawing territorial boundaries and, ultimately, cause conflicting rights-claims between peoples? The potential and limitation of this proposal is not sufficiently discussed in the work reviewed here, Stoutenburg’s proposal included.

One particularly interesting and genuinely new idea for rethinking statehood that has been introduced by the representatives of small island states, but not explored in these volumes, is the concept of a “large/big oceanic state.”²⁹ According to the islanders, their countries should not be

Determination: Sea-level Rise and Deterritorialized Small Island States,” *Ethics, Policy & Environment* 17, no. 2 (2014): 1–13; and Milla Emilia Vaha, “Drowning Under: Small Island States and the Right to Exist,” *Journal of International Political Theory* 10, no. 1 (2015): 206–223.

²⁵ Maxine Burkett, “The Nation Ex-Situ,” in Gerrard and Wannier, *Threatened Island Nations*, 89–121.

²⁶ See for instance Alliance of Small Island States, “AOSIS: A history of leadership at the UNFCCC,” by Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom, president of the Republic of Maldives, on 1 December 2015, available at: <http://aosis.org/aosis-a-history-of-leadership-at-the-unfccc/>, accessed on 31 July 2017.

²⁷ “State extinction,” as I describe in my earlier work, refers to “a situation in which a state faces a very real and imminent threat of disappearance from the surface of the Earth.” Vaha, “Drowning Under,” 207.

²⁸ Pacific Island Development Forum, *Suva Declaration on Climate Change*, issued at the 3rd Leaders Summit, 2–4 September 2015, available at: <http://pacificidf.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/PACIFIC-ISLAND-DEVELOPMENT-FORUM-SUVA-DECLARATION-ON-CLIMATE-CHANGE.v2.pdf>, accessed on 9 September 2017.

²⁹ According to the former president of the Maldives, Mohamed Nasheed, he launched the concept to emphasize the geographical size of the Maldives at sea. Interview with Mohamed Nasheed in Colombo, 12 June 2017.

perceived as “small states” at all but, instead, as *large states with significant oceanic territories*. While the books touch upon the rights over maritime and exclusive economic zones in the future, none of the writers contemplate the idea of *statehood at sea*. As with the question of continuous existence on another state’s territory, the idea of a large oceanic state also begs us to ask how the international state system could respond to or substantiate the idea. The question goes to the very heart of the international politics of statehood by challenging the idea of the sovereign state as being bound by territory *on land*. The role of small island states might therefore be more significant than their size or the scale of climate threats would suggest, insofar as their possible futures force us to find solutions not only to climate change mitigation and adaptation but also to the overall structure of the international state system.

On a related note, whereas the future of jurisdictional maritime zones is touched upon in both Stoutenburg and the articles in Gerrard and Wannier, the importance of fisheries and other forms of “blue economy” are not sufficiently addressed in these works, and definitely should have been, especially in the Gerrard and Wannier chapters.³⁰ In the words of the former president of the Seychelles, the “blue economy” is “about the sustainable use of the sea to meet human needs.”³¹ The idea of a “large oceanic state” is directly linked to the authority over maritime revenues. Almost all endangered island nations have a significant fishing industry. The South Pacific region, for instance, produces roughly half of the world’s skipjack tuna supply. They therefore have obvious national interests in securing the rights over these revenues for the years to come.³²

As is always the case in international politics—of which international law, law making, and the state system are all essential parts—only political practice can reveal how the global governance will materialize. The future scenarios of small island states are yet to be seen as well. I believe that all of the reviewed books would have benefitted from the creation of tighter analytical

³⁰ Interestingly, the term “fisheries” is not even indexed as its own category in Gerrard and Wannier, despite the importance that fisheries have for the future of small island states and the claims they make over their maritime territories. It is indexed, however, under “maritime jurisdiction.” Even then, it is only briefly discussed in Powers and Stucko, “Introducing the Law of the Sea,” 131–133. The topic is indirectly approached by Reyfuse, who elaborates on the importance of freezing maritime boundaries, and is more extensively discussed in Stoutenburg. See Reyfuse, “Sea Level Rise and Maritime Zones,” 187–190; and Stoutenburg, *Disappearing Island States*, chapters 2 and 3. I would like to thank Professor Edvard Hviding for pointing out this important matter to me with regards to the articles in Gerrard and Wannier.

³¹ James Alix Michel, *Rethinking the Oceans: Towards the Blue Economy* (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2016), xvi.

³² Pacific countries had already ratified the *Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of Common Interest* in 1982 (amended in 2010) with which they manage regional fishing quotas under the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency. See, for instance, Amanda Nickson, “The Future of the World’s Largest Tuna Fishery,” the PEW Charitable Trusts on 1 May 2015, available at: <http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/analysis/2015/04/30/the-future-of-the-worlds-largest-tuna-fishery>, accessed on 8 September 2017.

connections to international politics beyond climate governance. What the future of international law with regards to the endangered nations will look like depends on the political decisions made and strategies applied by the actors involved.³³ Fisheries serve as an important example here, as it is the case that it is not only endangered island states that hold interests in the exploitation of these vast maritime resources.

Jonathon Barnett accurately points out in his recent article that “normalizing the loss of atoll countries” in scholarly and political practice might also be harmful to both the endangered nations themselves and climate governance in general. Instead of the language and politics of desperation, Barnett thus argues that we should aim at developing a more hopeful imagery of the future of these states.³⁴ In addition to politics, then, the future of small island states and other endangered political communities is also dependent on predominant normativity.

All of the studies would thus have benefited from a wider comparative perspective, whether in regional, disciplinary, or theoretical terms. It has become evident through my own research in different regions that survival strategies between the countries in the South Pacific and the Maldives in the Indian Ocean vary significantly,³⁵ and even in the case of the Pacific, Tong’s conviction that relocation is the *only* strategy is not shared by all. Hence, the solution that might fit one or two states might not work for other endangered nations.³⁶ This kind of case sensitivity is of course hard to achieve if one looks at the situation of small island states and solutions to their hardship from the perspective of international law and the state system alone, for the simple reason that international law is based on the assumption of equality among nation states that itself limits the exceptions to the rule and alternative imaginaries.

³³ Wesley Morgan has written about the powerful and strategic means that small island states have employed in international negotiations. It is not therefore straightforward to portray small island states as “victims” when they actually exercise very subtle yet powerful agency in order to achieve their goals and international recognition. On the topic of Pacific states in international trade regimes, see Morgan, “Negotiating Power in Contemporary Pacific Trade Diplomacy,” in Fry and Tarte, *The New Pacific Diplomacy*, 251–262. I am grateful for the several times I have exchanged ideas with Wes on the issue, including listening to his inspirational talk at the University of South Pacific, entitled “Pivotal Players: Pacific Islands and the End of the Fossil Fuel Era,” in Suva on 27 July 2017.

³⁴ Jonathon Barnett, “The Dilemmas of Normalizing Losses from Climate Change: Towards a Hope for Pacific Atoll Countries,” *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 58, no. 1 (2017): 3–13.

³⁵ Interviews with Maldivian governmental officials on 9 March 2016 and on 12 June 2017. These interviews were conducted confidentially, and the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement.

³⁶ Skillington refers to the Maldives several times as a “Pacific nation.” Skillington, *Climate Justice*, 190, 194. I give the author the benefit of the doubt and believe this is an innocent human error. However, it nicely illustrates how small island states are often grouped as one, homogenous association of states. As Stoutenburg’s historical analysis demonstrates, there is no agreement even on the contemporary grouping of “small island states” and the small island states research should therefore be more sensitive to regional and local variations among these states. See Stoutenburg, *Disappearing Island States*, 11–70.

In a similar vein, while climate change is obviously a global phenomenon and demands global solutions, regional perspectives and independent actors should not be sidelined, as effective climate change adaptation and mitigation can only be accomplished on the ground. In order to efficiently tackle climate threats, it seems to me that the global cannot proceed without the local. Here, the knowledge produced by disciplines such as regional anthropology is crucially important. Skillington, for instance, tries to offer a model for global governance of climate harms by relying on a predominantly cosmopolitan framework without taking into account the possibility of truly regional solutions. Legal scholar Jane McAdam has in her work on forced migration noted that all the South Pacific nations share a nomad history. Given the background of these societies, then, contemplating their relocation might be fruitless in the first place.³⁷ Perhaps what we are about to see are some forms of truly stateless regional arrangements instead.

After Paris, before the Anthropocene

All of the volumes were written before the Paris Agreement came into force, a document that not only goes further from the existing United Nations climate documents in identifying specific responsibilities related to climate change but that was also ratified exceptionally quickly by the majority of world states, including the big polluters such as the United States and China.³⁸ As I pointed out in the first part of this article, the Paris Agreement offered hope to endangered nations that their situation would finally be taken seriously by international society. Did the Paris Agreement truly offer mechanisms for more effective climate governance, especially from the perspective of international law? What the agreement does offer is explicit commitments by countries to decrease their emissions and to report their progress regularly. How will these commitments transfer to the effective global governance of climate change and, eventually, to a more just international order? It would be interesting to see how the discussions in the books would have developed had the authors had the knowledge of the outcome and aftermath of the Paris negotiations.

In November 2017, Fiji, one of the small island states, will chair the Concert of Parties meeting in Bonn, Germany.³⁹ The ball is now not only in the Fijian court, but in the court of the small island states as a group, as they play a leading role in the global fight against climate change. It is a battle that

³⁷ McAdam, *Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law*, 123.

³⁸ The United States, however, pulled out of the agreement soon after Donald Trump took office in 2017. What the future of US participation entails is yet to be seen.

³⁹ This article was submitted in September 2017, two months before the forthcoming COP23 climate negotiations. As was the case with the books reviewed for this article with regards to the Paris Agreement, at this stage I remain unaware of the results of the climate negotiations led by Fiji.

involves scholars, practitioners, citizens, and states alike, both locally and globally. Small island states have proven their capacity to actively frame international debate and political agenda before.⁴⁰ Despite their small size, they have been extraordinarily successful in bringing their interests into international negotiation tables, “loss and damage” being the latest example. We should not therefore undermine the soft power these states entertain, even under the circumstances in which some more powerful players, most importantly the United States under the Trump Administration, are refusing to take the lead in the global fight against climate change. In the words of Prime Minister Voreque Bainimarama of Fiji, “we who are most vulnerable must be heard, whether we come from the Pacific or other Small Island Developing States, other low lying nations and states or threatened cities in the developed world like Miami, New York, Venice or Rotterdam. But together we must speak out for the whole world—every global citizen—because no one, no matter who they are or where they live, will ultimately escape the impact of climate change.”⁴¹ The books reviewed here offer important food for thought in the journey ahead.

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⁴⁰ On small island states and agenda setting, see Stoutenburg, *Disappearing Island States*, chapter 1.

⁴¹ Statement by Prime Minister of Fiji Voreque Bainimarama, on 18 May 2017, available at <https://cop23.com.fj/fijis-vision-cop23/>, accessed on 31 July 2017.